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David Fisher· 
A s military lawyers are well aware, the international legal framework for the protection and assistance of civilians in conflict situations is well developed 
and deeply integrated into the ways lawyers and laypeopJe think and talk about 
war. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the cornerstone of international hwnani-
tarian law (IHL), have now achieved universal adhesion;l over seventy nations 
have formed national commissions on IHl;2 and lHL is being studied and wri tten 
about in universities, mili tary academies and other forums around the world. In 
contrast, the law of international disaster response, referred to in recent years as 
"International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles" or "IDRL," has been 
described as "neglected'" and "far from complete,"· with no centralized regime 
equivalent to the Geneva Conventions, few academic resources dedicated to the is-
sue and, until recently, li ttle attention from the international disaster relief 
community . 
.. Senior Legal Research Officer for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies' program on International Disaster Response Laws, Rules and Principles. The views 
and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
those of the International Federation. 
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Yet, over the last thirty-five years, there have been over fourteen thousand non-
conflict disasters worldwide, resulting in more than 2.3 million deaths and affect-
ing an astonishing 5.8 billion persons.s In the overwhelming majority ofthcse di-
sasters, the governments, civil society and communities of the affected States have 
borne the brunt of relief and recovery themselves. However, international response 
activities have also necessarily been frequent6 and are increasing in proportion to 
the growing number and severity of disasters in recent years? Moreover, interna-
tional disaster operations can sometimes be just as legally challenging as conflict 
relief, commonly involving barriers to the entry and effective use of relicfperson-
nel, goods, equipment and transport vehicles, as well as regulatory dilemmas for af-
fected States-particularly in light of the growing number and diversity of 
international disaster responders. 
For their part, military actors have long been engaged in disaster relief,s but their 
involvement at the international level also appears to be on the rise. This increased 
engagement has led to a greater concern among military lawyers about the legal 
pitfalls involved,9 as well as concerns in the humanitarian community about the 
consequences of the "militarization" of international disaster assistance. 
This paper will sketch the history and broad outlines of the current interna-
tionallegal framework for transborder disaster relief and recoverylO and discuss 
some of the most common legal problems that arise in international operations. It 
will then look-from a civilian's perspective-at some of the ramifications for mil-
itary actors. It will conclude with some thoughts on where the international com-
munity might choose to go from here. 
Historical Background 
While there are early precedents for international reliefin peacetime, it was not un-
til the mid-nineteenth century that momentwn slowly began to build toward in-
ternational systems to address national calamities.!1 For example, in 185 1, France 
convened the first of a series of international sanitary conferences to negotiate 
agreements to combat the cross-border spread of diseases. 12 In 1869, a resolution 
of the second International Conference of the Red Cross affirmed the role of na-
tional Red Cross societies in providing relief "in case of public calamity which, like 
war, demands immediate and organized assistance."13 In the latc nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, multilateral telegraph and telecommunications treaties 
were adopted with specific provisions about emergency communications,14 and 
maritime agreements were reached codifying customary norms on rescue and as-
sistance to vessels in distress. IS 
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It was under the auspices of the League of Nations that the first serious attempt 
was made to create a comprehensive approach to international disaster relief. In 
1927, a conference offorty-three States adopted the Convention and Statutes Es-
tablishing an International Relief Union (IRU).16 The Convention stipulated that 
the lRU should serve as a centralized operational agency, funneling international 
funds and support in disaster settings, coordinating other actors and promoting 
study and research on disaster managementY Jt entered into force in 1932 and 
eventually attracted thirty member States. However, it was never able to effectively 
carry out its mission, due mainly to the crippling lack of funds incident to its in-
ability to command regular contributions from member States.18 Jt intervened in 
two disasters and sponsored several scientific studies, but by the late 1930s, the IRU 
had already effectively ceased to function, though it was not officially terminated 
until 1967.19 
After the failure of the IRU, international law on disaster relief developed in a 
fragmented and mostly unplanned manner, and institutional mandates were 
shared among a number of actors. In the 1950s, several States, notably the United 
States, began concluding bilateral treaties regulating the delivery of relief goods.20 
A second and third wave of bilateral treaties, mainly concerned with mutual 
assistance, were agreed upon in the 1970s and the 1990s respectively, mainly in 
EurOpe.21 Moreover, a number of multilateral treaties in other sectors of the law 
(such as customs harmonization,n marine and air transportll and environmental 
protection2~) began to include provisions relevant to international disaster re-
sponse, and recent decades have seen an upsurge in disaster-focused instruments 
(both "hard" and "soft"), particularly at the regional level. 
A second attempt to develop a comprehensive treaty on disaster relief was made 
in 1984, when the United Nations Disaster Response Office (UNDRO), the fore-
runner to the Office for the Coordination ofHwnanitarian Affairs (OCHA), devel-
oped a "Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency Assistance" 
and presented it tothe Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).2s The Draft Con-
vention sought to set out basic rules for the entry and operation of international di-
saster relief from States and humanitarian organizations, including with regard to 
visas, customs clearance, transport rules, communications and liability. ECOSOC 
referred the text to the UN's Second Committee,26 which, despite expressions of 
support from several States,27 took no official action on it, and the convention was 
never adopted. 
295 
The Law of International Disaster Response 
The Current International Legal Framework 
As a result of the forego ing, the current international legal and institutional frame-
work for lORl is dispersed, with gaps of scope, geographic coverage and precision. 
Still, there are a nwnber of instruments that are worth highlighting-both for their 
potential uses and for their weaknesses. 
Global Treaties 
One of the most successful disaster law instruments in terms of ratification is the 
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emer-
gency of 1986 (hereinafter Nuclear Accident Convention). 28 Adopted in the imme-
diate wake of the Chernobyl accident, the Nuclear Accident Convention has 
garnered ninety-six State parties.29 It lays out basic rules for the initiation, coordi-
nation and operation of international assistance operations in case of nuclear or ra-
diological events, touching on the transit of equipment and personnel, privileges 
and immunities, and costs. However, as its name indicates, it is relevant only to nu-
clear and radiological emergencies-among the least frequent of the various types 
of major disasters.30 Moreover, by its terms, it applies only to States, the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (lA£A) and other "inter-governmental organiza-
tions," despite the essential role that the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-State actors have played in the 
recovery from the Chernobyl disaster.3! 
In contrast, the two global customs treaties with specific provisions on disaster 
response both apply to "relief consignments" regardless of their source. They are 
thus relevant to the full range of international relief actors. Specifically, Annexes 
8.3 and J.5 of the Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures (<< Kyoto Convention") as amended in 199932 call on States to exempt 
"relief consignments" from many normal customs processes, duties and restric-
tions. Similarly, Annex 8.9 of the Convention on Temporary Admission ("Istanbul 
Convention" ) of 199013 provides for exemptions from customs duties for certain 
types of equipment intended for re-export after a disaster relief operation. How-
ever, their membership is quite small,34 and, in particular, includes only a handful 
of the most disaster-prone States.3S 
Another recent convention that applies to the full range of international disas-
ter responders is the Tampere Convention on the Provision ofTelecommunica-
tion Resources for Disaster Mitigation and Relief Operations of 1998.39 The 
Tampere Convention calls for the elimination or reduction of regulatory barriers 
to the importation and operation oftelecommunications equipment and person-
nel for disaster response purposes. I t is the only instrument of its kind that extends 
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privileges and immunities, equivalent to those granted to the United Nations, to 
NGO personnel (though only those directly connected to relieftelecommunica-
tions).40 
The Tampere Convention entered into force on January 8, 2005, and its first test 
came in Sri Lanka (which had ratified it in 1999) with regard to the response to the 
December 26, 2004 tsunami. Unfortunately, it appears that its provisions were in-
voked neither by the government nor by international relief providers, although 
some of them encountered problems with regard to the import and use of telecom-
munications equipment.4 1 On the other hand, some practitioners have reported 
success in referring to the treaty, even with regard to operations in States not party 
to it, as evidence of an international consensus on the need to facilitate the use of 
telecommunications in relief.42 Still, like the customs conventions, membership in 
the Tampere Convention remains limited43 and currently includes only four of the 
twenty-five most disaster-prone States.44 
In 2000, the International Civil Defence Organization drafted a Framework 
Convention on Civil Defence Assistance}6 to improve mutual assistance between 
civil defense organizations in international disaster response operations. The 
Framework Convention sets out mechanisms for the offer and acceptance of assis-
tance, regulations for how such assistance should be carried out, provisions for the 
reduction of administrative and customs barriers and "necessary" privileges and 
immunities for responders, and commitments to facilitate transit of civil defense 
units. It also calls on parties to supplement its provisions with more detailed agree-
ments to carry out its spiritY Though it has twenty-six signatories, to date only 
thirteen States have ratified or acceded to it, including no Western States.38 
A further iORL convention with limited membership (twenty-two parties, in-
cluding twenty-one States and the European Community'S) is the Food Aid Con-
vention.46 Originally adopted in 1967, it has gone through several revisions, the 
most recent of which was in 1999. It sets out annual quotas of certain types offood 
aid47 to be provided by each member (whether bilaterally or through NGOs or 
"multilateral channels" ) to certain recipient States, covering both emergency and 
non-emergency situations. It also sets out a number of guidelines as to the type and 
manner in which food aid should be delivered, including adherence to "basic hu-
manitarian principles," international quality standards and local dietary habits, 
and attention to the particular needs of women and children and other vulnerable 
groups, as well as potential harmful effects on local hanrests and markets. 
Critics have charged that the Food Aid Convention fails to effectively stabilize 
food aid because quotas have been set very low (substantially below the total 
amount of food aid given by most members) and have been repeatedly renegoti-
ated downward in periods of tight supplies and that little effort is made to monitor 
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the quality requirements.48 The convention is currently set to expire on June 30, 
2007, if it is not extended or renegotiated.49 
Limited membership is unlikely to be a problem for the revised International 
Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2005 and 
scheduled to enter into force in 2007,50 inasmuch as the constitution of the assem-
bly provides that all instruments adopted by that body will be binding on all mem-
ber States unless they explicitly "opt OU1."51 The revised IHR were prompted by 
communications failures in the SARS outbreak of2003 and has been described as a 
radical development in international health law.52 It expands the scope of its prede-
cessor instrument (which only applied to three types of disease) by obligating State 
parties to report on all diseases that might constitute a transborder public health 
threat and by greatly expanding the authority of the World Health Organization 
(WHO ) to act upon information of outbreaks. Significantly, this includes for -
malizing WHO's authority to receive and act upon reports originating from non-
governmental actors.53 Beyond this preventive aspect, the IHR's provisions requir-
ing national public health restrictions on import of goods to be kept to a reasonable 
minimum in line with the potential threat might also be of use in a disaster re-
sponse setting in which goods and personnel must quickly cross borders. 
Regional Law 
Each of the major regions has also adopted at least some law on disaster response, 
though there is great variation in its scope. As in other areas of international law, 
Europe boasts the most elaborate framework of agreements. These include, among 
others, the Fourth Lome Convention of 1989,54 which sets out guidelines for assis-
tance by Europe to African, Caribbean and Pacific States; the Council of Europe---
Open Partial Agreement (EUR-OPA) Major Hazards Agreement of 1987, which 
created a framework of regular high-level meetings to improve cooperation in di-
saster response and prevention;SS the European Community Civil Protection 
Mechanism, first adopted in 200 1, which helps to coordinate the extraterritorial 
work of civil protection offices;56 the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents of 1992, one of the most important treaties on man-made di-
sasters;S7 subregional instruments such as the Agreement between Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway and Sweden on Cooperation across State Frontiers to Prevent or 
Limit Damage to Persons or Property or to the Environment in the Case of Acci-
dents of 1989;58 and the Agreement among the Governments of the Participating 
States of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) on Collaboration in Emer-
gency Assistance and Emergency Response to Natural and Man-Made Disasters of 
1998 (hereinafter BSEC Agreement).59 
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In the Americas, the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assis-
tance was adopted in 1991 60 with a number of provisions designed to lower bu-
reaucratic and other barriers to easy entry of foreign disaster assistance; however, it 
was only ratified by three States.61 Greater success was seen with the agreements 
creating subregional inter-governmental mechanisms for disaster response, in-
duding the Coordination Centre for Natural Disaster Prevention in Central Amer-
ica (CEPREDENAC),62 the Andean Committee for the Prevention and Response 
to Disasters (CAPRADE),63 and the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response 
Agency (CDERA).64 
In Africa, there has been little systematic lawmaking at the regional level on di-
saster response.6S One exception is the Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop-
ment (IGAD),66 originally created with the primary purpose of building 
cooperation to address issues of drought and desertification. Moreover, in recent 
years, proposals have been discussed to adopt a disaster-specific instrument in the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).67 
The most recent regionallDRl treaty was adopted in Asia in the wake of the 
2004 tsunami . The Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation Agreement on Disaster Management and 
Emergency Response of2005 (not yet in force) (hereinafter ASEAN Agreement)68 
is remarkable for its broad scope--<overing disaster risk reduction, rellef and re-
covery and addressing all types of international disaster responders-as well as for 
its attention to some of the key problem areas, induding visas, customs, transport 
and coordination issues in international operations. It will also create a dedicated 
"Asian Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance" with broad responsi-
bilities to share information and assist in coordinating disaster assistance to mem-
ber States both in the region and from international actors. 
Bilateral Treaties and Agreements 
The overwhelming bulk of existing internationallDRL instruments are bilateral 
agreements between States and between States and international humanitarian or-
ganizations. There are well over one hundred bilateral treaties, most of them in Eu-
rope.69 In general, they tend to cover issues of initiation of assistance, entry of 
personnel and goods, command and control of response teams, assignment of 
costs (generally to the receiving State), and guarantees against liability (always in 
favor ofthe responding State). Bilateral agreements with humanitarian organiza-
tions (mostly with international organizations, such as UN agencies, but also, in-
creasingly, with major international NGOs) tend to set out the parameters of the 
organization's long-term activities in the nation as well as any applicable legal 
privileges. 
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Soft Law, Guidelines and Models 
Beyond the "hard law" described above, there are an important number of relevant 
"soft law" instruments, such as resolutions or declarations of international bodies, 
as well as guidelines, models and codes developed mainly by experts or by the hu-
manitarian community itself. Some of these, though admirably crafted, have been 
mainly forgotten. However, others have formed the basis for systems of interna-
tional cooperation in disaster response that are certainly as important as any cur-
rently based on "hard law." 
Among the best-known resolutions are UN General Assembly Resolution 46/ 
182 of 1991 , which sets out general parameters for UN humanitarian assistance 
and the role of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 
and 57/150 of 2002, which called on States to facilitate the entry and operation of 
international urban search and rescue teams in disaster settings and, in turn, called 
on those teams to comply with the quality standards set out in guidelines devel-
oped and facilitated by an international advisory group. The Hyogo Framework for 
Action, adopted by an international conference in 200570 and later affirmed by a 
resolution of the UN General Assembly, also includes institutional and regional 
preparedness for relief among its primary priorities/I but this element has not 
been emphasized in the follow-up activities of States and the United Nations. 
An important resolution that is less well known today is the Measures to Expe-
dite International Relief, adopted by both the International Conference of the Red 
Cross and the UN General Assembly in 1977.12 This resolution discussed in some 
detail some of the most practical types oflegal facilities governments should ensure 
for international disaster assistance providers. Unfortunately, it has rarely been 
evoked in modern operations. 
A number of "off-the-shelf' models and guidelines have also been produced 
with the intention to speed agreements between affected States and international 
actors wishing to provide assistance. For military actors, the Oslo Guidelines on the 
Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, as updated in 2006 and 
discussed in greater detail below, is the most important example. Further guidance 
can be found in the UNIT AR Model Rules for Disaster Relief of 1996 and the Max 
Planck Institution Draft International Guidelines for Humanitarian Assistance of 
1991.73 However, few of these latter documents are well known by disaster re-
sponse professionals. 
The most important instruments relating to the responsibilities of disaster assis-
tance providers are the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief of 
1994 and the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in 
Disaster Response as updated in 2004, both developed by humanitarian 
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organizations to serve as minimum standards of behavior and performance in di-
saster reli ef.7~ Both have been well disseminated, and most established humanitar-
ian organizations have indicated that they use them. However, the absence of any 
formal mechanism for monitoring and verification of these claims renders an as-
sessment of their impact difficult. 
Institutional Mandates and Privileges 
In addition to these disaster-specific instruments, the international community 
has provided a number of institutions with formal mandates to engage in humani-
tarian relief, including in disaster situations. The intricacies of this institutional 
structure have been described elsewhere7s and will not be explored here, except to 
note that they include both global and regional institutions. At the global level, 
these include UN agencies and organs and the Red CrossJRed Crescent Movement 
among others. At the regional level, organizations such as ASEAN, the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), IGAD, the European Commu-
nity Civil Protection Mechanism, CEPREDENAC and CDERA have also been ac-
corded important roles with regard to the coordination of international disaster 
response. 
To a varying extent, these entities have also been provided specific facilities per-
tinent to their operations. For example, the Convention on Privileges and Immu-
nities of the United Nations of 194676 and the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of 194777 provide the basis for the recogni-
tion of domestic legal personality of UN entities, as well as important exemptions 
to normal rules concerning visas, customs, judicial oversight and other regulatory 
systems. Similar privileges and immunities have been accorded to the international 
components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement in bilateral agreements 
with States.18 
Importantly, the NGO sector lacks a formal international legal mandate for its 
activities, although its effectiveness and prominence is large and growing, as dis-
cussed further below. 
Summary 
In short, there are a number of international instruments relevant to disaster re-
sponse but their proliferation has not resulted in a coherent legal system. Likewise, 
it has been argued with regard to institutional mandates that "there is no interna-
tional relief system per se, as the diverse set of actors displays little structural inter-
dependence [and lacks] a common boundary, other than the fact that each 
component may on occasion contribute to the relief process. " 79 OCHA is currently 
leading a process of reform to address structural coordination and cooperation 
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problems among UN agencies and their humanitarian partners;80however, the in-
ternational humanitarian community has yet to pay significant attention to the 
harmonization of the legal framework. 
Legal Problems in International Disaster Response 
The absence of a com prehensive system of international law on any particular 
topic is not necessarily a reason for concern. The question is whether there are 
problems of a legal or regulatory nature that have been left unaddressed. Insofar as 
international disaster response is concerned, the answer to this question is that 
there are indeed a number of such problems that arise consistently in major inter-
national operations and constitute a substantial drag on their speed, efficiency and 
effectiveness. In significant part, these problems can be attributed to the absence of 
previously established laws, regulations and institutional structures focused on in-
ternational assistance at the national level. Thus, for example, the Pakistani gov-
ernment has acknowledged that "Pakistan suffered from the lack of a pre-existing 
National Disaster Management Authority" and applicable legal structure when the 
earthquake struck in October 2005.81 Likewise, the United States Government Ac-
countability Office issued a report in the wake of Hurricane Katrina concluding 
that "FEMA and other agencies did not have policies and procedures in place to en-
sure the proper acceptance and distribution of in-kind assistance donated by for-
eign countries and militaries."82 
Typical problems in in ternational response can be roughly divided into two 
main categories: legal obstacles to the entry and operation of international relief; 
and failures of monitoring, coordination and regulation of international aid. Prob-
lems of both categories usually coincide in the same disaster operations. This sec-
tion will provide a few recent examples. 
Obstacles to Entry and Operations 
The initiation of international disaster assistance can be difficult for political, 
rather than legal, reasons, as some governments have been reluctant to request or 
accept needed aid for fear of appearing weak o r dependent, to avoid publicity for a 
disaster, and/or to demonstrate their disapproval of the offering party.83 Govern-
ments are likewise sometimes unwilling to provide basic information about a di-
saster for similar reasons, leaving potential responders at a loss as to how best to 
react.84 O n the other hand, it has also been the case that foreign donors have pres-
sured governments to accept assistance they did not really need. For example, it was 
reported that a large number of foreign governments insisted on sending field hos-
pitals and medical personnel to Indonesia in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, despite 
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pleas from the Indonesian government and the World Health O rganization that 
they were not required.8s 
Frequently, however, the problem is more technical. While many States have 
some provision in their law as to which department (frequently the office of the 
prime minister or president) may initiate a request for international disaster assis-
tance, the lack of standardized systems for making the determination that outside 
help is needed has led to long delays ,l16 and communication about specific needs is 
often imperfect. Thus, for example, after Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005, 
it was reported that a Swedish government plane loaded with water purification 
gear, blankets and telecommunications equipment was kept on a runway for 
eleven days awaiting clearance to fly to the United States.87 By the time pennission 
was granted and the plane was able to depart, none of the supplies it carried were 
still needed. 
Sometimes, entry visas for international disaster response personnel have been 
either delayed or refused by the governments of affected States, even after interna-
tional assistance has been requested. For example, several States in Central Amer-
ica have refused visas to relief personnel from other parts of Latin America, in part 
due to heightened concerns about illegal immigration.sa In most cases, however, 
response personnel have been able to enter affected States on tourist or short-term 
visas, but problems have emerged later in the operation. For instance, in terna-
tional personnel responding to the 2004 tsunami in Thailand and In donesia were 
required to frequently exit and re-enter those nations in order to renew short-term 
visas. incurring both significant expense and disruption to their operations.89 
Regulations on the passage of relief transport vehicles and customs delays on in-
coming goods and equipment are other critical barriers in many operations.90 For 
example, one year after the tsunami struck Indonesia, over four hundred contain-
ers of relief goods were still awaiting customs clearance in Jakarta and Medan.9J In 
the meantime, many of the perishable items rotted, medicines expired, and some 
items that were needed at the onset of the response operation (such as tents and 
surgical equipment) were no longer required.92 After H urricane Katrina struck the 
United States, the British Ministry of Defence sent five hundred thousand "Meals 
Ready to Eat" (MREs) by civil aircraft.9) However, after their arrival in Arkansas, it 
was determined that they contained meat products prohibited by US health regula-
tions, and they were therefore stored in a warehouse at significant expense for a 
number of months pending distribution to other countries.94 
Delays can also arise before goods even reach the borders of the affected nation. 
For example, in August 2006, after strong winds in Swaziland left thirteen thousand 
persons homeless and exposed to ongoing heavy rains. the IFRC's regional delega-
tion in H arare. Zimbabwe sent a shipment of tarpaulins and tents.95 However, the 
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shipment was delayed at the border with South Africa for five days before they 
could proceed to the destination nation, due to problems with customs. Analo-
gously, overflight of transit States can occasionally raise difficulties, as when Paki-
stan reportedly refused to allow flights of Indian aid to Afghanistan to cross its 
airspace.96 
Sometimes customs delays cause headaches over and above the obvious issue of 
forestalling the intended use of the affected goods and equipment. For instance, af-
ter the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, it was reported that relief goods delayed in cus-
toms beyond the statutory storage deadline had been summarily nationalizedY 
Somewhat analogously, in Indonesia, storage fees for tsunami relief cargo awaiting 
customs clearance mounted so high due to delays that they sometimes exceeded 
the value of the relief consignments themselves.98 Charges of this type, as well as 
customs duties and other types of taxes, tolls and fees on disaster operations, have 
dramatically increased their costs and lowered their effectiveness. In Sri Lanka, for 
example, Oxfam was required to pay a £550,000 customs duty in June 2005 to im-
port twenty-five four-wheel vehicles for its tsunami rehabilitation operations.99 
Another common issue that some international disaster responders encounter 
is obtaining recognition of their domestic legal status in the affected State. In Thai-
land, forexampie, international NGOs found the local registration process sodiffi-
cult to navigate that nearly none were successful in doing SO.loo As a result, some 
had difficulty opening bank accounts, obtaining work permits, hiring local staff 
and applying for tax exemptions. \01 
Similarly, obtaining recognition of the foreign qualifications of medical person-
nel has frequently proven difficult. In Nepal, for instance, it was reported that 
[wJhilst some organisations were aware of the process of obtaining permission from 
the Medical Council of Nepal, the process was a lengthy one and not easily adapted to 
emergency situations. Other organisations were not aware of the necessary processes, 
and in at least one instance a prominent medical NGO was asked to cease activities 
altogether for failing to comply with the regulations.102 
Furthermore, fo reign actors lacking d iplomatic or inter-governmental privi-
leges and immunities find themselves exposed to the risk of civil and/or criminal Ii-
ability in unfamiliar legal systems. On the civil side, local employee recruitment 
and tennination reportedly provide particularly fertile ground for litigation in di-
saster response operations as domestic labor laws generally fail to accommodate 
the speedy and short-term staffing requirements of international disaster response 
operations. 103 Medical malpractice has also been identified as an area of particular 
concern. I04 Exposure to criminal investigation was raised as an issue by a number 
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of disaster responders to the 1999 earthquake in Turkey, and one that substantially 
affected their operations. lOS 
Problems of Quality and Coordination 
Closely related to entry and operation barriers are issues of quality and adequate 
coordination of international relief and recovery assistance. In the absence of effec-
tive international mechanisms of control, affected State governments have often 
struggled to address the flood of external actors responding to those major disas-
ters with the highest media attention. I06 
Perhaps the most important quality issue is the arrival of vast quanti ties of un-
wanted, unneeded and inappropriate relief goods, which embroil customs offices, 
fill airports and warehouses, and block the flow of needed goods. For example, in 
each of the largest disaster operations of2oo5 (e.g., the tsunami in Indonesia, Thai-
land and India; the earthquake in Pakistan; and Hurricane Katrina in the United 
States), heaps of used clothing appeared. In tropical Sri Lanka, these included win-
ter coats and hats, dress shoes, pyjama tops (without bottoms) and even "thong 
underwear."107 In Muzaffarabad, Pakistan, piles of useless warm-weather clothes 
were burned for warmth. lOS As noted by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEe) 
report-a major multiagency study of the international response to the 2004 tsu-
nami-"assistance" in the form of used clothes, expired or poorly labeled medi-
cines, inappropriate food (such as canned pork sent to Muslim Indonesia), and 
other assorted eccentric items is "not just worthless to the recipients; it has a nega-
tive value. It occupies storage and transport space at the very time when this is 
needed for real aid. It then requires special handling to dispose of-all an addi-
tional burden on a response."I09 
In addition to increased shipments of goods, major disasters are attracting 
larger numbers ofintemational actors on the ground. The growth in the numbers 
ofNGOs becoming involved in disaster response has been particularly impressive. 
For example, after the December 2004 tsunami, it was reported that there were two 
hundred NGOs working in Aceh.I IO In India, nearly three hundred NGOs were re-
ported to be working in Nagapattinam District alone. ll l While particularly pro-
nounced after the tsunami, this trend can be seen in other highly televised disasters 
as wel1. 112 In addition, more UN agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, 
private companies and unaffiliated individuals are travelling to disaster sites seek-
ing to help. ]]) 
Among these new actors, many are inexperienced and some act without suffi-
cient understanding of, or regard for, international standards of quality in disaster 
response. As noted by the TEe report, "[ tJ here is general agreement that there were 
far too many agencies present in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The low entry barrier to 
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the system permits the entry of inexperienced and incompetent actors," and while 
"[ eJxperienced agencies are not immune from low quality work ... the risks are 
higher with inexperienced actors . "I I ~ Thus, for example, an unidentified NGO was 
found to have vaccinated children in a village near Banda Aceh, Indonesia after the 
tsunami, leaving no records and no way to determine who had been vaccinated and 
who had not. llS 
Many "traditional" humanitarians in tsunami-affected nations were also 
shocked to find themselves working alongside "Scientologist trawna care" workers 
who purported to heal tsunami victims by influencing energy waves with their 
hands. ll6 To their dismay, and as noted in one media report from India, "[iJn the 
eyes of the local public, [Scientology's] operations are indistinguishable from those 
of UNICEF and CARE and the Red Cross." ll7 Other purportedly "humanitarian" 
organizations were accused of proselytizing in several tsunami-affected nations, 
and even conditioning aid on religious conversion. 11 8 
Probably the most common complaints in disaster operations revolve around 
problems of coordination and sharing of information between the various actors. 
The proliferation of international responders has done nothing to improve these 
problems. In the tsunami operations, for example, " ]a]chieving adequate repre-
sentation and consensus among even the larger, mature INGOs and Red Cross 
agencies was not easy; but with such a large number of smaller agencies also on the 
ground in the first six months, coherent joint planning and implementation was 
unlikely."119 Aceh was dubbed an "information black hole" where overfunded hu-
manitarian agencies competed for beneficiaries, overselVing some communities 
and ignoring the needs of others. 120 
International coordination mechanisms remain largely voluntary--even 
among UN agencies-and have struggled to prevent irregular coverage of disaster-
affected persons.l2l For their part, national institutional frameworks for monitor-
ing and coordination of international relief were overwhelmed in both Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka, leading to multiple structural changes over the course of the relief 
and recovery operations in both nations. 122 
However, even with a more modest international intelVention, governments of 
the affected States have experienced significant difficulty in the absence of strong 
regulatory and institutional mechanisms. For example, after Tropical Storm Stan 
caused massive flooding in Guatemala in October 2005, it was widely recognized 
that the national disaster management network "CONRED" and its secretariat 
were unable to track and coordinate the activities of the several dozen foreign orga-
nizations and States that arrived to provide assistance.123 In contrast, in Fiji, after a 
detailed legal and regulatory structure was put in place for international relief, few 
coordination problems were noted in recent disaster operations.12~ 
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Ramifications for Mili tary Actors 
How does all of this relate to military actors? First. as noted above. militaries in a 
number of nations are becoming increasingly keen on international disaster relief. 
both on a bilateral and multilateral basis. As noted by the United Nations. "Mem-
ber States. even those who do not give a primary role to their military forces in do-
mestic response. are now using their military capacity for relief operations on a 
global basis. nilS For example. in 1992, Japan amended its law on international di-
saster relief to provide a specific role for its military forces. which have been active 
in operations ever since. 126 Similarly. in 1996. the Canadian military created a per-
manent disaster response team to be used for foreign disaster operations.L27 The 
US military, long mandated to participate in international disaster relief. has also 
increased its emphasis on "humanitarian" activities in recent years. 128 For instance. 
its contribution after the 2004 tsunami was its biggest operation in the Asia- Pacific 
region since the Vietnam War.129 The Americans. Japanese and Canadians joined 
no less than thirty-two other national militaries that responded to the tsunami. 1.30 
Similarly. in 1998 NATO created its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordina-
tion Centre (EADRCC) and has also embraced a "growing humanitarian role" in 
disaster response operations, including for Hurricane Katrina in the United States 
and the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. L31 NATO has even gone so far as to 
negotiate its own memorandum of understanding with member States for the fa-
cilitation of civilian relief personnel and materiel. U2 Proposals have recently been 
raised for regional military cooperation mechanisms in Central America and Asia 
to facilitate military involvement in disaster relief. L33 
Second. military responders experience many of the same legal issues and con-
cerns as civilian actors in disaster response operations, as well as issues uniquely re-
lated to the commonly strict domestic regulation of their mandates and roles in 
international operations and the special sovereignty and security concerns that the 
presence offoreign troops raise for affected States. L3-t As noted in one summary of 
the "lessons learned" from NATO's intervention in Pakistan. "[ t lhe importance of 
working with host governments must not be underestimated. Many issues must be 
resolved before operations forces arrive, including terms of entry, force protection, 
legal status. communication channels. liaison arrangements, contracting arrange-
ments. use ofland for basing and translators. "135 
Third. military responders face a similarly patchy normative framework. Few 
existing disaster-related treaties make specific reference to military involvement, 
though many of their more general provisions (for example. on facilitating entry of 
goods and personnel) should also apply to military responders. Those that do have 
specific reference, such as the ASEAN Agreement, 136 the BSEC Agreement, L37 and 
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the Agreement of 1974 between Sweden and Norway concerning the Improvement 
of Rescue Services in Frontier Areas138 commonly seek to address issues of the 
command relationship between the assisting and affected State forces, identifica-
tion of foreign forces (e.g., uniforms) and the carriage of arms. When they are in 
place, bilateral or regional (e.g., NATO) status of forces agreements or MOUs ad-
dress a nwnber of the issues that might arise for mili tary actors in disaster opera-
tions. l39 However, they are limited in number and difficult to negotiate at the 
outset of a disaster. 
The pre-eminent "soft law" instrwnent on military involvement in disaster re-
lief is the Oslo Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disas-
ter Relief. First developed by the United Nations and endorsed by an international 
conference in Oslo in 1994, the Oslo Guidelines were updated and "relaunched" at 
a new conference in November 2006. 140 Particularly as updated this year, the 
guidelines stress that military relief assets should be considered a last resort when 
no civilian alternatives are available. 141 They also encourage (though do not re-
quire) military and civil defense forces to act "under UN control" in disaster opera-
tions.142 They set out minimum facilities that should be offered by affected States, 
in areas such as legal status, customs, visas, overflight and security, and also set out 
coordination structures and basic principles to which military and civil defense op-
erations should adhere. They also include a model agreement addressing these 
sorts of issues as an annex. 
The emphasis in the Oslo Guidelines on civilian control reflects the current am-
biguity in the humanitarian community about the increasing role of the mili tary in 
disaster operations. On the one hand, the capacities and achievements of mili tary 
actors in international disaster relief-particularly in the areas of transport and lo-
gistics-are undeniable. For instance, the international military contributions to 
the tsunami relief have been described as pivotal to the success in avoiding the 
feared "second tsunami" of starvation and disease. 143 On the other hand, military 
assistance is expensive-sometimes many times more costly than when the same 
services are provided by civilian sourcesl44-and its identification and integration 
with humanitarian activities raises thorny policy issues. These are particularly 
acute in armed conflict settings, when military attempts to "win hearts and minds" 
can confuse the distinction between military and humanitarian agencies, render-
ing the latter more liable to attack. 14s However, even in disaster settings, an overly 
dose identification has been seen as dangerous for public perceptions of the neu-
trality of humanitarian actors. Moreover, there is concern that precedent set for 
dose integration between military and humanitarian actors in a disaster setting 
may be difficult to alter in a later situation of conflict. l46 Thus, the Oslo Guidelines 
call for "direct assistance" to be provided as much as possible by humanitarian 
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actors, with militaries instead providing "indirect assistance" (such as transport 
and logistical aid) and "infrastructure support" (such as rebuilding roads and gen-
erating power).147 
Conclusion and Prospects for the Future 
It seems plain that some improvements in the way that international disaster assis-
tance is generally facilitated and regulated would be desirable. While every disaster 
setting is in some ways unique, and the very nature of the enterprise (particularly in 
sudden-onset disasters) lends itself to some level of improvisation, the fac t that a 
consistent set of legal problems tends to crop up in disaster settings around the 
world suggests that better regulation may have a role in improving the outcome of 
disaster relief operations. 
At the national level, a workable balance still remains to be struck in most States 
between sufficient openness to allow quick entry and easy operation of interna-
tional disaster assistance and sufficient control to ensure the quali ty and overall ef-
fectiveness of a relief and recovery effort. International actors (both civilian and 
military) and affected State governments have suffered alike from this imbalance, 
to the detriment of efficient support to affected persons. To address this, more gov-
ernments need to thoroughly analyze such issues and adopt appropriate legislation 
and regulations prior to being struck by a disaster. Some-particularly those struck 
by major disasters in 200S148_are beginning to do so, and others might be led to it 
through their activities pursuant to the Hyogo Framework. 
At the international level, the dissemination and use of existing instruments 
could be much improved. 149 Even if this occurs, however, there are significant gaps 
in the current framework when measured against the common problem areas. 
Nevertheless, one commentator, noting the spotty historical development of inter-
national norms in this area, ongoing State concerns about sovereignty, and the re-
cently enhanced emphasis of the international community on disaster risk 
reduction has concluded that "the direct role of international law with respect to 
the policy on natural disasters will not grow significantly. "ISO On the other hand, as 
described above, recent years have seen significant "hard" and "soft" law develop-
ments, including the ASEAN Agreement, the International Health Regulations, the 
entry into force of the Tampere Convention, the NATO MOU and the revision and 
reaffirmation of the Oslo Guidelines. In fact, there seems to be no shortage of will 
to address some of the relevant issues, but rather a continuing lack of coherence 
and comprehensiveness among current initiatives. 
Looking to the future, the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent, a forum including all State parties to the Geneva Conventions as well as 
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the various components of the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. is scheduled to 
take up a set of recommendations on the issues described in this paper in Novem-
ber 2007-particularly with regard to what States might be encouraged to include 
in domestic law and policy. The consultation process leading to that conference. 
including regional forums organized with governmental and inter-governmental 
pa rtners around the globe. has already begu n generating greater publicity and 
attention to these issues. lSi Moreover. the International Law Commission (a UN 
body whose object is the "promotion of the progressive development of international 
law and its codification"152) recently decided to place the issue of the "protection of 
persons in natural disasters" on its long-term program of work. 153 There is thus reason 
to hope that there will be greater progress on these issues in the near future. 
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